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Technology is a concept which is embedded in the problem
of allocation of scarce resources for national defense. The
purpose of this thesis is to provide some insights on the
relationship of technology to that problem by using a form
of neo-classical analysis similar to that found in the
economic literature. That analysis places technology
explicitly into a mathematical programming model of a
resource allocation problem.
The research strategy for accomplishing this purpose
took the following course. A view of the process of defense
resource allocation was adopted. Fro:i; Lhis view aggregate
variables were identified. These variables and a set of
resource constraints were then placed into related sub-
models. A mathematical program was structured from these
sub-models as if defense resource allocation was a cen-
tralized decision process. From this program a series of
results were obtained in the areas of decision rules for
efficient resource allocation, parameter variation, and
decentralization possibilities. The next few paragraphs
will discuss the elements of this strategy.
Shell, Karl, ed. "A Model of Inventive Activity and
Capital Accumulation" by Karl Shell, Essays on the Theory
of Optimal Economic Growth
, pp. 67-85, The M.I.T. Press,
1967.

As a frame of reference in the strategy outlined above,
the viewpoint of this thesis is that the Planning, Program-
ming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) for the Department of
Defense (DOD) is essentially an iterative process between
the Secretary of Defense, and the service chiefs, which
solves the defense resource allocation problem. In concept
this iterative process consists of the passing between these
participants of a set of internally generated valuations
placed on a list of commodity amounts. At each iteration
both the valuations and quantities are altered until an
equilibrium is reached and an exchange takes place in the
form of the annual defense budget. In concept termination
of the iterations occurs when the Secretary of Defense is
satisfied with the equilibrium reached.
The variables referred to in the above research strategy
discussion are modeled in this paper as aggregate measures
of technology, military effectiveness, material, manpower,
an operating and maintenance budget, and a procurement
budget.
The measures of material and manpower are considered as
a dichotimization of all the factors of production of
military effectiveness into two aggregate categories, one
non-human, the other human. The choice of budgetary con-
straints as operating and maintenance, and procurement
provides for a separation of money resources into an area
concerned with current production costs and an area
concerned with future factor costs. The principle of ease

of understanding, which can come from aggregate modeling,
is also applied to military effectiveness by symbolizing it
as a singular commodity. The same rationale is applied in
modeling technology as if it was a single entity. Since the
nature of technology is somewhat elusive, the second section
of this paper is devoted to a discussion on modeling tech-
nology, its nature and associated terminology.
With these variables, an associated set of resource
constraints are constructed from the underlying iterative
procedure of PPBS, considered as if it was a centralized
decision-making process. These constraints were organized
into sub-model groupings. These sub-models and their inter-
relationships are explained in the third section of this
pipyx . In the fourth beuLiui: Lhc-: objective tuiict-iori of Lhe
mathematical program constructed from these sub-models and
what its maximization means in terms of a centralized
decision maker, the Secretary of Defense, is discussed.
Also discussed in that section is the characterization and
interpretation of an efficient allocation of resources. In
the fifth section it is described how the variables of the
model behave when the parameters of the model are altered.
Decentralization possibilities within the model are briefly
addressed in the sixth section. The author summarizes in
the last section and has some concluding comments on areas





Using the example of a nation's economic performance for
successive periods, this chapter will discuss methods for
modeling technology and the associated terminology. While
most of the information in this chapter is a collective good
in the market place of economic literature it can be found
2
collected most marketably by M. Ishaq Nadiri.
Aggregate economic analyses typically model a nation as
producing a single output, a composite commodity available
for final consumption and investment measured in terms of
the total amount of goods and services flowing to house-
holds in a given time period (Q ) . This is inL^rpreLaijle
as the Gross National Product (GNP) . Two factors are con-
sidered as inputs, capital service, sometimes measured in
machine-hours used in a time period (K ) , and labor service,
sometimes measured in man-hours used in a period (L ) . A
continuous functional form which relates these three measure-
ments is assumed to exist.
Q t = Q(Kt , Lt )
By considering particular functional forms for Q, like
the Cobb-Douglas function, and by using econometric methods
2Nadiri, Ishaq, M. "Some Approaches to the Theory and
Measurement of Total Factor Productivity: A Survey,"
Journal of Economic Literature , Vol. Ill, No. 4, December,
1970.

such as linear regression, economists have felt that the
changes in the amounts of the two factors do not fully
explain the changes in the composite commodity over succes-
3
sive years. An additional concept, the technology of a
nation, has been introduced by economists into the two fac-
tor model to help explain the changes in the quantity of
composite commodity over successive periods. The manner in
which to introduce technology in order to modify the two
factor model depends upon the particular viewpoint taken on
the nature of technology.
One viewpoint of technology is that it is a function of
the number of inventions patented in a given period. Another
is that it is a third factor of production, for example a
L-udy of knowledge completely exogenous to the economic
market mechanism and with the characteristics of a collec-
tive good. Still another is that technology is embodied in
labor so that, for example, each vintage or year group of
union journeymen is not homogeneous with every other but
has a different productivity associated with it. Similarly
technology can be thought of as being embodied in capital
so that each machine is not homogeneous with every other
but has a different productivity associated with it depend-
ing upon its year of introduction into service. Technology
can also be considered disembodied from both capital and
labor. In such cases it might be measured in terms of
3 Ibid, p. 1140.

pounds of blueprints per period or number of technical
reports per period. Additionally, technology may be viewed
as factor-augmenting so that an increase in the productivity
of either factor is modeled as equivalent to an increase in
the amount employed of that factor.
In all of the above cases technology can have a bias
toward either capital-saving or labor-saving or toward both
equally in an offsetting manner in which case it is termed
neutral. The bias ideas can be seen more clearly with the
aid of Figure 1 and a set of equations.




The equation set is the amount of composite commodity
for four given time periods as a function of capital service
and labor service and is represented by the isoquants (Q,
,
Q., Q-., Q.) on Figure 1. All the isoquants are to be con-
sidered as isoquants of equal magnitude (Q, = Q„ = Q-. = Q 4 ),
that is they all represent one specific level of output of
the composite commodity and the physical relationship which
brings together the two factors, capital service and labor
service, in various possible mixtures to produce that level.
The lines L K each being tangent to an isoquant represent
a fixed ratio of marginal physical products for the partic-
ular period.
The points of intersection (E, , E„, E^, E.) are the
points which determine an efficient ird.xtu.jLe of capiLcii seir—
vice and labor service to achieve the particular isoquant.
These points can be interpreted in another way if it is
assumed that a market structure exists which guarantees a
competitive equilibrium. If such a structure existed it
could consist of a labor providing sector and a capital
providing sector which receive their share of the composite
commodity in proportion with their respective marginal
productivities so that all of the composite commodity is
exhausted.
The relationship between Q, and CU shows a capital-
saving bias in that the same amount of composite commodity
is being produced in each period with the same amount of
labor service but less capital service. Generally, a
11

relationship between two equal isoquants with one isoquant
more toward the labor service axis than the capital service
axis is interpreted as labor-saving bias. Neutral bias is
exhibited by the relationship between Q^ and Q. in that the
difference in positions between the two is in a parallel
fashion toward the origin and does not favor either factor.
Besides discussing the relationship of positions between
isoquants of equal magnitude, the shape of any one isoquant
can also be discussed with respect to technology. Such a
discussion revolves around the elasticity of substitution
between the two factors of capital and labor.
The slope of each isoquant at any particular point can
be used to obtain the elasticity of substitution. This is
".one by changing the :jlcpc into a percentage change In one
factor needed if substituted for a percentage change in the
other. Technology can also alter the shape of the isoquant
as well as its position and consequently the elasticity of
substitution.
When discussing the shape of the isoquant and conse-
quently its elasticity, the question of aggregation is
raised. To understand why, consider the theoretical
development behind the continuous production function of
one output and two factors. Assume first that three pro-
duction activities exist which each combine capital service
and labor service in a linear fashion, and which can be
brought together in combinations to produce one output.










By considering many linear activities available to produce
the one output and arranging them properly, the kinks in
the isoquants begin to smooth out until in the hueristic
limit a continuous isoquant convex to the origin is attained.
The contention is that technical advances will occur in
localized areas and have few spillovers to the other tech-
niques or activities of production causing only a minor
perturbation in the smoothed out isoquant rather than a
wholesale shift. An example of this argument is illustrated
in Figure 3.
Atkinson, A. and Stiglitz , J. "A New View of Techno-









If Figure 3 represents the production of wheat from a field
and the three activities are by hand, with a mule, and with
a tractor, technical advance in tractors would not of con-
sequence likewise increase the productivity of the hand
plow, or mule-drawn equipment.
This author conjectures however that because the output
considered in discussing a nation's economy is an aggregated
or composite commodity rather than a specific output, and
that because the factors of production are also aggregates
,
that technical advances in the aggregate are diffused
throughout an area of composite activities and can cause




Intuitively the possible relationships between the
isoquants in successive periods can also be viewed as
responsive to the trend that factor price ratios are taking
if a partial look at a total economy is considered. For
example, if the trend of factor prices is considered
exogenous to an individual production decision maker and
is such that the sequence of ratios of the cost of labor
service to the cost of capital service causes the L^K^c t t
lines of Figure 1 to approach the vertical, the cost of
capital service in relation to the cost of labor service
is becoming very significant with respect to the total
amount of resources available to an individual production
decision maker in a period. Such a trend as seen by indi-
vidual decision makers within an economy may induce the
bias in their decisions which in the aggregate may induce
the bias toward adoption of capital-saving techniques. A
converse inducement can be hypothesized for decisions
behind labor-saving innovations.
When economists consider the performance of an economy
from period to period there arises the question of which
sequences of resource allocations causes change in the level
of output which can be considered preferred with respect to
a particularly selected criterion. Figure 4 shows a pro-
portional change path, sometimes called a linear change
path, for the case of one composite commodity and two





The line OA is called a proportional path. The L K lines
are parallel to each other implying a ratio of marginal
physical products which is constant over successive periods
If it is assumed that a pure competitive equilibrium exists
then the L.K lines would be the ratio of factor prices.
In terms of such a competitive equilibrium the dynamics of
moving from one equilibrium through disequilibrium to
another equilibrium are not specified. Rather the state-
ments made are a comparison between successive equilibriums
The isoquants which now each represent different levels of
output can be thought of as holding positions in those suc-
cessive equilibriums along a line (OA) through the origin
16

perpendicular to the 1->.K lines, a consequence of constant
returns to scale.
The proportional path has certain virtues when the
criterion for choice between alternative paths is the least
change in factors employed between successive equilibriums.
As can be seen with the aid of Figure 4 , growth or contrac-
tion along the proportional path is the most preferred way
under this criterion because it requires the least change
in factors required between some initial equilibrium point
like E, and some end equilibrium point like E_.
If on this proportional path and neutral technological
change obtains then this author sees that situation as
intuitively stable. The intuition behind this is as
follows. If technology is neutral the shift in isoquants
is parallel to the origin and therefore along the propor-
tional path. Hence if on the proportional path neutral
technology is seen by this author as not influencing move-
ment off the path. If however successive equilibriums are
not on the proportional path but there exists bias toward
the appropriate input, the author conjectures that the
proportional change path can be attained as being on the




The author formulates in this section an aggregate
relationship from the areas involved in the DOD resource
allocation problem over a finite planning horizon. The
emphasis in the relationship is on modeling technology
explicitly into the problem. The relationship is pictured
in Figure 5
.
As an introduction to the discussion of the sub-models,
some general remarks are appropriate. These remarks are
addressed to the nature of technology as modeled in this
paper, the nature of the process depicted in Figure 5, and
the- nature of the decision process, at modeled, which allocates
resources
.
Technology is modeled in this paper as a single variable
on a ratio scale. The units of measurement chosen to express
this are a surrogate measurement, pounds of technical reports.
The phrase technical reports encompasses blueprints, engin-
eering tables, research papers, theses, etc., that is
technical reports in the broadest sense. Use of pounds of
technical reports is meant to convey the implication that a
tangible separable vehicle exists for the transmission of
technical knowledge and that there is a necessity to expend
resources to diffuse this knowledge. Additionally technology
is assumed to be disembodied and neutral. Disembodiment



































labor inputs are homogeneous. Vintage considerations of
capital and labor are therefore not determinants of produc-
tivity of capital and labor. Technology although modeled
as disembodied can have a bias toward capital-saving or
toward labor-saving innovations or toward both equally in
which case it is neutral. It is assumed in this paper that
technology is neutral.
The nature of the process depicted in Figure 5 is
similar to a two stage production process. The first stage
is the diffusion of technical knowledge on innovations by
application of manpower and material. Diffusion is defined
in this paper as a flow or a transmission of this knowledge
by searching out its existence in sources external to the
defense c r. r.a r.usu~g - r f r," refining existing knowledge , and
determining its applications. An apportionment, which may
or may not be exhaustive, is made of this diffused knowledge
between the second stage of the process, production of
military effectiveness, and the diffusion activity for the
next period. This apportionment also acts as a modeling
transformation of the flow of knowledge into two separate
stocks which are carried over into the next period. Each
stock again becomes a flow of knowledge within the next
period when incorporated for its particular use.
An example to clarify this process and the stock-flow
issue seems appropriate. Consider knowledge on technical
innovations as water none of which is lost in this example.
The diffusion activity searches out water from external
20

sources for the current time period. Through a system of
pipelines this water is pumped by the diffusion activity
crew through a series of steam heated coils. By the end
of the current time period these coils have changed the
water into steam. This steam is then divided into two
parts and stored until the beginning of the next period.
One part of the steam is then made to flow through the
coil system again for further use by the diffusion activity.
The other part is applied to the military effectiveness
activity where it is made to flow through a mechanism which
utilizes it as a source to enhance the production of mili-
tary effectiveness.
In the following discussion of the sub-models the
decisions on tne allocation of resources arc referred to as
if made by a central decision maker, the Secretary of
Defense, with the aid of a mathematical program. The work-
ings of such a program are described in detail in the fourth
section of this paper.
1. Technology Diffusion Sub-Model
The Technology Diffusion Sub-Model has as its out-
put within each period the total flow of knowledge on
technical innovations diffused throughout the defense
establishment in the current period (T ) . Diffusion of this
level of knowledge requires an expenditure of a mixture of
material service, henceforth called capital, measured in
machine-hours („K ) , and manpower service, henceforth called
labor, measured in man-hours ( L ) . The portion of the
21

stock destined for the diffusion activity in the previous













An important inferrence to note with regard to the function
T and its argument T , is that the flow of knowledge is
lagged so as to model the phenomenon of incubation of ideas.
Within the current time period the total flow of diffused
knowledge on technical innovations is apportioned between
the production of military effectiveness ( nT, ) and the
diffusion activity ( T ) . This apportionment as previously
stated acts as a transformation of the total flow of ideas
between periods. Together these two portions can be no
greater than the total flow diffused in the current period
(T
t ).
T + T < T (2)Q t T t - t v
If the sum of the two portions is not equal to the total
amount diffused, that is the mutually exclusive subsets are
not exhaustive, the constraint is not binding in mathematical
programming terms. The implication is that some diffused
knowledge may be left over in each period. Such a residual
if it exists is modeled as being lost to the system for that
period.
The total amount of flow of knowledge on technical inno-
vations diffused in a period (T ) is modeled as limited by
22

a potential flow made available for diffusion in that period




t < 3 >
A constraint of this sort is plausible in reality in that
the external sources, research foundations, business research
and development, etc., can push the frontiers of innovation
just so far in a particular period because they face scarce
resources. If this constraint is not binding the implica-
tion is that some of the available knowledge may be left
over in that period. Such a residual if it exists is
modeled as being lost to the system for that period.
2 . Technology Production Sub-Model
describing change in technology. The product of the sub-
model for the current period is the potential amount of flow
of diffusable knowledge on technical innovations made avail-
able by sources external to DOD ( T, ) . The change in this
potentially diffusable amount is modeled as a period to
period increase by a factor (y) which is constant over time.
T = (y) T (4)
p t p t-1
Note that the equality of this constraint implies that the
flow of diffusable knowledge is always increasing and never
depleted by diffusion. This means that if some diffusable
or diffused knowledge flow is lost to the system in one
period, as indicated earlier might be the case, it is not
lost to the system forever.
23

Modeling the change of technology as in this sub-model
captures what this author conjectures is a common perception
of this aspect of technology. That perception is that
technology is an aggregate thing which is growing from period
to period at a rate external to the influence of an insti-
tute such as DOD. In reality DOD can and does stimulate
the advance of knowledge by funding basic research. In a
modeling sense this phenomenon has not been addressed but
could be accomplished by development of the sub-model
offered in this paper to include a cost for a particular y.
In a sense the workings of the two technology sub-models
can be thought of as transforming a collective good into two
private goods by a diffusion mechanism. The collective good
is the potentially diffusabie flow of knowledge from external
sources ( T, ) . It is a collective good in that it can be
p t r
consumed without being depleted for further consumption and
that it requires no resource expenditures, as modeled, to
obtain. The private goods ( TT .. / nT -h^ are consi(3ered private,XL. \s L-
in either of their stock or flow states, as a result of the
diffusion process. Such an interpretation of the two sub-
models is meant to capture two ideas. The first is the
restrictive nature of security measures associated with the
diffusion of defense oriented technical knowledge. The
second is the concept of a separable diffusion vehicle, that




A choice to make in the face of technology as modeled
in these two sub-models is how to choose the mix of capital
and labor to diffuse the level of technical knowledge chosen
As previously mentioned the next chapter will explain in
detail how a mathematical program is used to aid this choice
when DOD is modeled as if it was a centralized decision
making institution.
3. Military Effectiveness Sub-Model
The Military Effectiveness Sub-Model is essentially
of the neo-classical production function form with the out-
put a level of military effectiveness for each time period
(Q ) . Producing this level for that period involves a mix-
ture of capital, measured in machine-hours (nK, ) , and labor
nieasuitiu in :uan-I:Ours ( L ). 'The. flew of diffused Technical
knowledge destined for military effectiveness production
(_T , ) becomes effective after a one period lag for incu-
bation.
Qt = Q(QKt , Lt . Tt_j) (5)
4 . Material Accounting Sub-Model
The Material Accounting Sub-Model consists of a
set of equations which essentially keeps track of the total
amount of capital (K ) , measured in machine-hours / available
in a given period to produce military effectiveness (nK , ) or






t i Kt <6)
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If this constraint is not binding the residual flow is
modeled as lost to the system for that period.
The total amount of capital available in the t period
(K. ) , is modeled as equal to the amount available in the
stt-1 period (K _ ) minus a portion from that period which
is disposed of at no cost and with no salvage value
(a(K , )) , plus an increment from the procurement model
stpurchased in the t-1 period ( VN. n ) . Note that an alter-
J\ t— 1
native way to think of free disposal and no salvage value
is to assume that the one equals the other. A phrase
associated with this idea is evaporative decay. Hence a
can be thought of as the rate of evaporative decay of
capital.
K, — K. , — Ct \i< - ) '< „N -. { I)
u t-1 t-1 K t-1
The rate of evaporative decay of capital is modeled as
external to the influence of the decision mechanism in DOD.
An alternate view is that a retirement scheme for capital
is embodied in a as a form of institutionalized choice, that
is a predetermined decision rule. Consequently there is
no need in the model implied for a choice to be made each
period with regard to retirement of capital. Note that no
distinction is made in the Material Accounting Sub-Model
between vintages of capital. The assumption of homogeneity
is made with regards to the use of capital either in produc-
tion of military effectiveness or diffusion of technical
knowledge. The former distinction is consistent with the
26

idea of disembodiment of technology and the
latter assump-
tion implies the existence of a choice over the
mixtures of
capital devoted to military effectiveness or further
diffu-
sion of technical knowledge.
5. Material Procurement Sub-Model
The Material Procurement Sub-Model provides the
input of procurement ( RN t ) to the
Material Accounting Sub-
Model for the t+l
st period. A time lag of one period is
assumed to be required between purchase and
employment of
the increment. Physical limitations are modeled
on the
amount purchased by assuming the increment
purchasable in
one period can be no greater than a multiplicative
factor
( V ) times the increment purchased in the
previous period.
K
KNt < ( K
V) k^.!
(8)
Purchases are assumed made from sources external
to DOD.
The multiplicative factor ( Rv)
characterizes the trend new
capital manufacturing capacity these external
sources are
maintaining. It is therefore modeled that the size
of the
procurements by DOD in one period effects the maximum
size
of procurement available to be purchased in the
next period.
Thus the sub-model of procurement essentially
considers the
combined effect of decisions internal and external
to DOD
with regard to the maximum amount of available
procurement.
6. Manpower Accounting Sub-Model
The Manpower Accounting Sub-Model contains a
set of




QLt + TLt i Lt (9)
Lt = Lt_x
- Btt^j.) + jjH^j (10)
The interpretations of these equations are similar to the
Material Accounting Sub-Model with the exception that in
reality there is no salvage value associated with labor.
Consequently the assumption must be made that there is
free disposal of labor. The rate of evaporative decay (8)
models then a situation in which forces external to the
incluence of DOD are depleting the supply of labor from
period to period but at no cost to DOD.
Again an alternative view is that a retirement scheme
for labor is embodied in 8 as a type of institutionalized
choice. Consequently bhere would be uo iieed in Lhe rfiodel
for a choice to be made each period with regard to retire-
ment of labor.
7. Manpower Procurement Sub-Model
The Manpower Procurement Sub-Model contains an
equation analogous to the Material Procurement Sub-Model
with some interpretational differences.
L
N
t i ( LV) LNt-l (11)
The multiplicative factor ( v) characterizes the trend
capacity of the labor producing sources external to DOD is
taking. This author views the labor market for DOD as con-
sisting of only a segment of the general population. As a
result v is not necessarily the same magnitude and direction
28

of the general population growth trend. The fact that the
amount of labor procurable in a period is influenced by the
amount procured in the previous period indicates that some
sort of influence can be exerted by DOD. Hence as in
capital procurement the constraint on the amount of labor
available for procurement in a period is modeled as in-
fluenced by forces both external and internal to DOD.
8. Cost Sub-Model
The Cost Sub-Model is an aggregated one. Two parts
to the overall budget are assumed to exist. The first is
linear in form and acts as an operating budget constraint.













*Q t' T"t"" Q""t'
°" lv>l
T^t' """ w
preted as before. The wage rate (w ) is measured in dollars
as valued in period t per man-hour. The operating and
maintenance cost of capital (q ) is measured in dollars as
valued in period t per machine-hour. Each rate is modeled
as an aggregate unit operating and maintenance cost measure
for that period. The operating and maintenance budget
constraint ( b ) is in units of dollars as measured in
period t.
The second part of the overall budget is modeled as a
non-linear procurement budget constraint.
c(kN t' lV i Pbt (13)
The choice variables (,N , N ) are interpreted as before.K t L t
The non-linearity of the procurement cost functions is
29

meant to make the model consistent with the idea of cost-
quantity relationships of learning by doing. That idea is
that the more units of something produced, the cheaper the
unit cost because of learning during the production process.
The variables of each period (w.
, q , , b , , b, ) are modeledc t ^t o t p t
as equal to a factor times the magnitude of the previous
period's figure, and therefore can be called predetermined
variables
.
w = co w _ (14)
q t = ^q t_!
(is)
b. = ( cr) b t ? (16)o t o o t-1
b. = ( a) b. , (17)
p t P P t-1
Since the units of magnitude of a predetermined variable
in one period are really not the same as the unit of magni-
tude of the predetermined variable in another period, i.e.,
dollars/man-hour in period t are not the same as dollars/
man-hour in period t-1, the factor must be in units of
dollars in period t per dollars in period t-1. Hence, each
factor besides incorporating a multiplicative growth or
decline in the magnitude of the predetermined variable due
to institutional forces (e.g. congressional appropriations),
also incorporates a period to period discounting factor.
A concluding comment in this chapter is appropriate with
regards to the parameters of this model and the constraints
with which they are associated. It is assumed that the
30

amounts of the predetermined variables are known in the base
period and that the rates at which they change, that is the
values of the parameters, are also known. The question of
misspecification of these rates can be thought of in terms




IV. THE MATHEMATICAL PROGRAM
The sub-models discussed in the last chapter can be
used to form a mathematical programming model of the DOD
resource allocation problem. Such a model is developed as
if DOD acts as a centralized decision-making system. From
manipulation of such a model the aggregate effect of tech-
nology on the resource allocation problem over a planning
horizon can be interpreted.
The objective function of the program is the vector
whose elements are each period's measure of military effec-
tiveness (Q, , Q~,...,Q ) for a planning horizon x. The
constraints of the program die Lhe" elements of the sub
models for all periods. The choice variables for, a given
period are (Qt , QKt , QL fc , T fc , QTt , ^ ^ ^ , ^ ^ .
The parameters for a given period are ((}>,, y, a, 3, v \> , T v,
oo , E , o, a) and the predetermined variables are ( T , , w ,op ^ pt't
q , , b, , b, ) .
^t o t p t
There are three phases to understanding the insights to
be gained from the mathematical programming model. The first
deals with what maximization of a vector objective function
means in the context of modeling the DOD resource allocation
problem as if it was a centralized decision-making process.
The second deals with the characterization of an efficient
set of allocation decisions. Both of these are discussed in
this section, while the third phase, the effects which can
32

be observed in the model from variations in the parameters,
is discussed in the fifth section of this paper.
To explain what maximization of the objective function
means with regards to a central decision maker, the Secre-
tary of Defense, consider the two period case illustrated
in Figure 6
.
The arc AB represents the infinity of possible efficient
physical trade-offs between military effectiveness in period
one and military effectiveness in period two. The arc is
assumed concave to the origin because of diminishing marginal
returns. The arc represents an efficiency frontier, or an
efficient rate of time productivity, of the production
possibility set in the following sense. If a point Q-, is
selected lor period one, Q„ is Lhe most efj-ectiveness which
can be had in period two because of scarcity of resources.
At the fixed point Q, then, any amount of effectiveness
produced below Q implies inefficient production of effec-
tiveness in period two. This trade-off curve would physically
exist because of the interlinkage of periods created in the
model by the application of a portion of a period's available
capital and labor to diffusion of knowledge on technical
innovations. This knowledge is then apportioned for use in
the next period between production of effectiveness or
further technical diffusion.
Arc CD is the indifference curve of a Secretary of
Defense. It is convex to the origin under the usual assump-






to less. With respect to arc CD, the tangent line FG
represents a ratio of marginal utilities or a psychological
trade-off by a Secretary of Defense over military effective-
ness in period one and military effectiveness in period two.
Another way of expressing this is to say that a Secretary
of Defense will have a rate of time preference as to how he
desires in his mind to trade-off effectiveness between, in
this example, the two periods. The line FG is of the form
<t-,Q-. + KQ ? = K. The units of cj), are units of some abstract
unit of account, in terms of utility theory utils, per unit
of military effectiveness in period one, and the units of
4>„ are units of some abstract unit of account, or utils,
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per unit of military effectiveness in period two. A typical
slope of an FG line in this two-dimensional example is
-<})/(}) which is in the units of effectiveness in period one
per units of effectiveness in period two and can be made to
represent the rate of time preference for a Secretary of
Defense. In this case units of effectiveness in period one
have been chosen as the numeraire, that is the base to which
the other period is compared.
Note that the line FG, being tangent also to arc AB,
also represents the ratio of marginal physical products or
alternately can be made to represent the rate of time pro-
ductivity between the two periods. Arcs like CD do not
necessarily have to touch the efficiency frontier, rather
they can slide along in a parallel fashion so that tangents
drawn to arc CD still reflect the same rate of time
preference. Points like E exist because of an equilibrium
assumption. Such an equilibrium assumption equates the
ratio of marginal physical products with the marginal
utilities or alternately equates the rate of time preferences
with the rate of time productivities. The concept of PPBS
as an iterative process which converges on an equilibrium
provides the intuition behind this equilibrium assumption.
At such an equilibrium point as E , a characterization
of an efficient resource allocation can be made with regards
to the set of choice variables. Such is the case because
for a specified pair in the two-dimensional example (<$>. /^^
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at an equilibrium point like E, no other configuration
gives more effectiveness. These <j> . ' s can be thought of as
efficiency prices.
Conceptually in the case of a planning horizon x, a
x-dimensional space exists with an associated efficiency
hypersurface which represents the infinity of efficient
physical trade-offs of effectiveness between all periods.
In concept a Secretary of Defense would specify his set of
rate of time preferences (cf>, , (j) ,...,<J> ) and choose a
U 1 cf> 2 <b T
numeraire for simplicity of expression — , — , ...,
—
[*$ *g «
As stated earlier an equilibrium between the expression of
a Secretary of Defense's rate of time preferences and the
rate of time productivity of the effectiveness production
process can exist because of the assumption that the PPBS
iterative process has led to an equilibrium and that all the
participants in this process are in their own equilibrium.
Based on this assumption a mathematical program constructed
from the sub-models can determine, in concept, the efficient
allocation over the set of choice variables.
The methods of solving a mathematical program generate
a set of values, one for each constraint, which essentially
state how much value can be added to the objective function
if an increase in that constraint could be realized. As a
consequence of the mathematical program then a set of these
values or prices is generated. These values are important
in the respect that they can act as communication devices
for a central decision-making system much as market prices
act as communication devices in a market mechanism. Because

of this the possibility exists to model the allocation of
resources decision problem as if it was a decentralized
system.
Conceptually if a numeraire is not chosen and all the
sets (4>i / §-,...,§ ) which are possible are considered as
parameterized (<{>,,
<J) 2 ,...,<J) ), the mathematical programming
formulation of the DOD resource allocation problem can be
made to yield a characterization of any one of all the effi-
cient solutions. Conceptually efficient points of resource
allocation can be computed from the program.
The statement of this mathematical program which follows
is made up of the objective function as discussed above and
constraints which are the components of the sub-models
discussed in the previous chapter.
max E cf) Q
t=l
subject to (for all t = 1,...,t)
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The characterization of an efficient set of allocation
decisions is obtained by using the LaGrange multiplier
technique. The LaGrange function is as follows.
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Somewhat unrigorously the LaGrange multipliers, . X
.
,
represent the change the value of the objective function
would undergo with a change of one unit of the constraint
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with which the multiplier is associated. Hence, each
LaGrange multiplier represents the value placed internally
on the marginal unit of that constraint. This internal
value is called synonymously imputed value, the shadow
price, or the opportunity cost.
The LaGrange function can be differentiated with
respect to each choice variable, and each LaGrange multi-
plier. If a maximum to the objective function exists, and
it is assumed one does for each possible set of the
parameterized (cf) , (J) , . . . , (J) ), applying the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions yields the set of equations which follow when
each choice variable is operated at a positive level and
each LaGrange multiplier is assumed positive. A positive
multiplier implies tnat one more unit of the constraint is
seen internally as contributing in a positive fashion toward
the value of the objective function. The following equations
result.
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N = ( v) N , (44)
L t V L ; L t-1
Note that equations (28) through (44) are the constraints
from the mathematical program but that they are now all bind-
ing. This is so because of the assumption that each LaGrange
multiplier was positive, i.e., one more unit of the associa-
ted constraint adds value to the objective function. An
important consequence of the equality of these constraints
is that no losses to the system occur in the sense of the
discussions on the matter in the sub-models secLion.
If a choice variable was not positive but equal to zero,
a "corner solution" would result. The equation associated
with that variable (18-27) would become an inequality less
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than or equal to zero, (e.g. T = ° "^
^^t+l d~~T 3^t — °^ '
If a LaGrange multiplier was not positive the result would be
that the associated constraint (28-44) would be of its orig-
inal form and not necessarily binding. The equations (18-44)
under the conditions stated characterize the efficient set of
resource allocations. Using the aforementioned interpreta-
tion of the LaGrange multipliers, equation (18) states that
the parameterized rates of psychological trade-off, or effi-
ciency prices, take on a value, when the Secretary of Defense
makes his choice, which is equal to the imputed value of
the marginal unit of effectiveness in period t.
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Equation (19) states that the imputed value of the mar-
ginal unit of diffused knowledge on technical innovations,
which can then be used in the next period to produce effec-
tiveness or to further diffuse technical knowledge, is equal
to the sum of two opportunity costs. The first is the oppor-
tunity cost of not having available one more unit of poten-
tially diffusable knowledge on technical innovations. The
second is the opportunity cost imputed to the amount of tech-
nical knowledge which has been diffused by employing capital,
labor, and part of the previous period's stock of technical
knowledge toward diffusion of technical knowledge in the t
period or diffusion of technical knowledge for use in the
next period.
mi, ., i .-, -c l i. -^~a j ^ ^ .e .m.-f .' _ „ i <s r\\ -:,-, +-u~ TTa l,1Q ,-n-P -t-'K ^
marginal physical product of diffused knowledge on technical
innovations in period t used to produce effectiveness in
period t+1. It is a value because of the multiplication of
the marginal physical product by the imputed value of the
marginal unit of effectiveness in period t+1. This value of
the marginal physical product is equal to the internally
generated shadow price of the marginal unit of knowledge on
technical innovations, diffused in period t.
The left hand side of equation (21) is the value of the
marginal physical product of diffused knowledge on technical
innovations in period t used to further diffuse knowledge in
period t+1. It is in value terms because of the multiplica-
tion of the marginal physical product by the imputed value
of the marginal unit of diffused technical knowledge in
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period t+1. This value of the marginal physical product is
also equal to the internally generated shadow price of the
marginal unit of knowledge on technical innovations,
diffused in period t.
Equating equations (20) and (21) with equation (19)
reveals the fact that the sum of the two opportunity costs
can act as the communication device which equates the two















t+l d~T~ (45)Q t T t
Equations (22) - (25) are similar to each other in inter-
pretation. For example, the left hand side of (22) is the
net benefits associated with the marginal unit of capital
empxoyeQ to produce errectxvenoss in period t« j. ti consists
of the value of the marginal physical product of capital
employed to produce effectiveness in period t, minus the
opportunity cost of funds in period t times the marginal
cost of capital employed to produce effectiveness in period
t. The right hand side in the shadow price of the marginal
unit of capital in period t. Therefore equation (22) says
that the marginal net benefits of a unit of capital employed
in the production of effectiveness in period t is equal to
the shadov; price of a unit of capital in period t. As
stated (23), (24), (25) have similar interpretations with
respect to their factors and differand.
Equating (22) and (24) says that an efficient point
of resource allocation with respect to the mixture of
capital for production of effectiveness and capital
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for diffusion of knowledge on technical innovations, is
characterized by the equality of their respective net mar-
ginal benefits.
Equating (23) and (25) yields similar results with
respect to the mixture of labor for production of effec-
tiveness and labor for diffusion of knowledge on technical
innovations
.
Taking the ratio of (22) and (23) yields the results
that the ratio of the marginal net benefit of capital
employed to produce effectiveness in period t with the
marginal net benefit of labor employed to produce effective-
ness in period t is equal to the ratio of their respective
shadow prices.
Similar interpretations are obtained by taking the
ratios of (24) and (25), (22) and (25), and (23) and (24).
By equating the ratios appropriately, for example (22)
to (23) with (24) to (25), the shadow prices are again
shown to be capable of acting as a communication device
which equates the ratios, and characterizes an efficient
point of resource allocation.
, 8Q , , 8T ,
l
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Up to this point only within period interpretations
have been made. The relationships obtained between (22)
through (25) also have intraperiod interpretations. Con-
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Equation (47) states that the ratio of the net marginal
benefits of capital employed to produce effectiveness in
period t to the net marginal benefits of capital similarly
employed in period t' is equal to the ratio of the shadow
prices of those respective factors.
A two-stage type of process has been modeled with tech-
nology which is diffused in one period going into produc-
tion of military effectiveness or further diffusion of
technology in the next period. Consistent with this idea
there does not exist a neatly interpretable relationship
between the factors of capital and labor ( nK. , K , L ,
_L.) and the inputs of technology ( nT. , T ). Such a
situation implies then that the latter are not totally
substitutable for the former in the process of production.
Equation (26) is concerned with the capital procurement
sub-model. The left hand. side is the marginal internal
st
value of effectiveness gained in the t+1 period from the
increases in capital procurement in t plus the marginal
internal value of effectiveness gained in t+1 from having
the capacity for construction of capital by external sources
available in t+1 because of the procurement in t. Note
however the presence of the externally determined factor v.
It implies that in fact procurement alone does not assure
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the existence of capacity, but that as modeled, the behavior
of the external sources is a factor also. The right hand
side of (26) is the opportunity cost of procurement funds
in period t times the marginal cost of capital procurement
plus the opportunity cost of funds employed in procurement
vice some other activity. Equation (26) as a whole says
that the internal value of the marginal unit of effective-
ness gained in t+1 from procurement in t is equal to the
total marginal cost of that procurement.
Equation (27) is interpreted similarly to (25) with
respect to labor procurement. Taking the ratio of (26) and
(27) obtains the results that the ratio of marginal internal
valuations of effectiveness of capital to labor procurement




This section explores one possibility of obtaining
qualitative comparisons between two equilibrium points which
the mathematical programming model can conceptually obtain.
Each equilibrium point of that program has an efficient set
of resource allocations and LaGrange multipliers associated
with it. The first set (X, X) will be called the original
optimum, and the second set (X, X) the new optimum. Each
equilibrium point has a set of parameters denoted (<^. r X,
/\ /\ s\
a, B, u>, £ , Qo , a, Rv, Lv) and (cf^., y, a, 3, go, £ , qo , o,
v, T v) respectively.
IN. Lj
the other cannot be specified in the terms of this model.
However the saddlepoints of the respective LaGrange functions
are available to use in an attempt to make qualitative state-
ments comparing these two points. The saddlepoints, the
LaGrange functions evaluated at the optimum, are L (X , X) and




L(X,X) > L(X,X) L(X,X) (48)
5Brent, Robert Stephen, A Model of the Planning, Pro-
gramming, and Budgeting Problem , M.S. Thesis, Naval Post-
graduate School, Monterey, 19 70.
Hadley, G. , Nonlinear and Dynamic Programming
, p. 75,
Addison-We sley Publishing Company, Inc., 1964.
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L' (X,A) >L'(X,A) >L'(X,A) (49)
L* (X,^) - L(X,X) > L' (X,X) - L(X,X) (50)
If all the parameters mentioned above have undergone a change
inequality (51) results. This is so because all those terms
of the LaGrangians which have not changed or which are not
multiplied by the parameters will fall out of inequality
(50) .
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If all the parameters have undergone a change either
increasing or decreasing between the two equilibrium points,
nothing qualitative can be said about inequality (51)
.
Quantitative information would be required to make statements
as to the effects of those parameter changes. Taken singly
the parameter changes are of two forms.
The first form is as follows.
A<J>
t (Qt
- Qt ) > (52)
If A<{), was positive period t's effectiveness measure is
receiving more or the same amount of internal valuation at
the new optimum than at the original one. Consequently the
level of military effectiveness will be greater or unchanged
—.4- +-V-.^-. noM (•"*?"* 4*"
"I T^mTn 4-Vi r>-^> ->+ 4-T-» o *-\-v--tr-r-ir->r3l *"»T» £± t.7*H i r-*V* XT) ^> V O c:u. <_ l-j1^ a- i. v_- »* s_/m uxiil \^uu k-* id** \-*w wa*^- -^ _ " , — * * c~_i. uiit- f W &.IJL, __ * O
intuitive sense. The converse would be true if A(f>. was
negative. If A<j), was zero nothing qualitative could be said
about the levels of military effectiveness in their respec-
tive optimums. The case of A(f>. being equal to zero is that
of indifference of time preferences between the levels of
effectiveness in those optimums. Consequently, the rela-
tionship of Q to Q could be one of either greater than,
less than, or equality.
The second form of a single parameter change requires
that all other parameters have remained the same between
the two optimums. An example of that form follows using
the potential technology constraint.
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*** 3 A t pVii^-x"- (53)
p t-1 3 t)
If Ay is greater than zero the following summation must hold
p t-1 3 t
Nothing qualitative can be said because of the summation.
Again, quantitative information would be required.
If one time period was isolated by assuming that all
the other terms in the summation add to zero, the following
inequality would hold.
Av A T - /E^zi _ 3M (5-5)




Vp t-1 3 A t/
If in period t the imputed value of the original potential
technology constraint is greater than zero (i.e. ~A > 0)
and the amount of the constraint available was greater than
zero in the previous period (i.e. T 4-_i > 0) then the follow-
ing inequality is true.
T . , -A,
E_tzi > l_t (56)
p
Tt-l 3 X t
This inequality says that if the valuation of potential
technology in the t period in the new optimum was greater
than in the original one, then the amount of potential
sttechnology in the t-1 period for the new optimum was
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proportionally greater than in the original one. Expanding
the basic model in this paper by time subscripting the
parameters (e.g. y ) is an alternate way of obtaining the
above results.
As another example from the expanded model consider the
comparison between two equilibrium points where all
parameters are constant except for the existence of A<j>. and









T^ l^Z.1- ^ > (57)
\pTt-l 3 A t/
Sixteen qualitative possibilities exist since there are
four terms, two A's and two parenthetical, and two signs,
the reader goes through all sixteen possibilities and inter-
prets the results in the qualitative manner of the preceding
examples, he will note that some reversals of previous
results may occur.
As an example of this consider the case where A<J> is
negative and Ay, is positive. If the parenthetical expres-
sion associated with Ay is positive then (Q - Q ) may be
positive or negative depending on the magnitude of the total
right hand term.
Of particular interest is exploring the possibility of
the model's ability to express qualitative relationships
between the differences in the rate of technological change
and some other parameter, holding all others constant,
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between two equilibriums. As an example consider , the
rate of change of labor costs, possibly a measure of local
inflation, between two equilibriums. All other parameters
held constant, the following inequality results.
(58)
Because of the summations nothing qualitative can be said
even when it is known what the signs of Ay and Aw are.
However by employing the subscripting of the expanded
model (i.e. Ay and Aco ) the summation signs fall out and
the results are again sixteen qualitative combinations with
reversals of results again possible.
Because of the twice differentiability of the functions
involved in the model and other qualities they are assumed
to have, it is possible to take total differentials of
equations (18) through (44) and then solve that system of
equations for the change in a particular choice variable
with respect to a change in a particular parameter. Quali-
tative statements may be obtainable which describe the
differences in two equilibriums expressed as partial deriva-





Up to this point a modeling approach of the DOD resource
allocation problem has been taken which assumes that a cen-
tral decision maker acts as if he had perfect information as
to all the specifications of all the constraints which appear
in the mathematical program. In reality it is doubtful that
a central decision maker could obtain all the information
needed for allocation of resources via a mathematical program
The information gathering costs would tend to be restrictive
in the face of scarce resources. Some sort of an approach
which models the DOD resource allocation problem as if it
was a ciecentrail zed system therefore seems appropriate and
is the topic of this section.
Such an approach essentially requires the existence of
a Central Planning Office and several subordinate field
7
offices. If the correct data is known completely by each
office, and if each office's director acts as if he had no
influence on the environment outside his office, then a
decentralized decision system may exist which converges to
a selected efficient solution in the form of an annual
defense budget.
7Marglm, Stephen A., Approaches to Dynamic Investment
Planning, North Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1967
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Essentially the method of modeling decentralization is
by the sub-models previously discussed so that each field
office relates to a sub-model with the Central Planning
Office being the office of the Secretary of Defense. Cer-
tain pieces of information are modeled as being held by each
field office and certain pieces are modeled as being held
by the Central Planning Office. From these pieces of infor-
mation some of which are modeled as being passed between
offices, a decentralized solution to the DOD resource allo-
cation problem might be obtainable which is identical with
the centralized solution. The key which allows the possible
decentralization is the LaGrange multipliers or shadow
prices
.
Consider the Military Eiiecliveness Field Office. :rhc:
information its director knows is the functional form Q. He
receives a set of efficiency prices from the Central Planning
Office ((f), ,$-,..., (j) ). From the Budgeting Field Office he
receives a composite operating and maintenance cost for
each factor he needs to employ in each period (f-A.q, , fi A. w ) .
These costs are composite because they reflect both the unit
cost of operating and maintaining that factor and the oppor-
tunity cost for funds in those periods. The Military
Effectiveness Field Office director must obtain the factors
he needs from the Material Accounting Field Office and the
Manpower Accounting Field Office ( K , L ). For each factor
he will be charged a shadow price (qA. ,,,A.) since the
Technology Field Office is competing for these factors also.
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Finally the Military Effectiveness Field Office director
communicates with the Technology Field Office on the amount
of technical knowledge on innovations (nT. ) available by
diffusion at an opportunity cost (t^) since the Technology
Field Office is competing internally for this knowledge
also to further diffuse knowledge.
If the Military Effectiveness Field Office director acts
as if he was a shadow profit maximizer he would then maxi-
mize the following unconstrained objective function.
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Assuming a maximum to the function exists , taking the
partial derivatives of tt with respect to each choice vari-
able (nK, , _L , T _, ) and setting those partial derivatives
equal to zero yields the conditions for efficient resource
allocation. Notably these conditions so obtained are
identical with those conditions expressed in equations (20)
,
(22) , and (23)
.
Consider the Technology Field Office. The information
its director knows is the functional form T. He also knows
the following constraints for each period.













The Technology Field Office director receives a set of
shadow values from the Central Planning Office (^A.
, 9 X„,
.i.,pXx). He also receives information from the Budget
Field Office and the Material Accounting and Manpower
Accounting Field Offices and internally from his own office,
similar to the information received by the Military Effec-
tiveness Field Office director. If the Technology Field
Office director acts as if he was a shadow profit maximizer
he would then maximize the following objective function.
T'
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Assuming a maximum to the function exists, taking the
partial derivatives of _tt with respect to each choice vari-
able ( mK, , mL , , _T, ,) and setting these partial derivativesit i t i i t—
1
to zero yields the conditions for efficient resource allo-
cation. Notably these conditions so obtained are identical
with those conditions expressed in equations (21), (24),
and (25) . Additionally the Technology Field Office director
knows he must supply the Military Effectiveness Field Office
director with technical knowledge but within the constraints
of (60) , (61) , and (62)
.
The Material Procurement Field Office director knows the





t ± ( KV) KNt-l (64)
He receives from the Central Planning Office a set of
shadow values ( D ^4./ -, r ^j-)* From the Budget Field Office he
o t .Lb t
receives a set of composite prices (_,A^ r £ ) . If he actsc c 7 t 3 N
K. t
as to maximize shadow profit a condition will result for
each period expressed just as equation (26) for efficient
resource allocation.
The Manpower Procurement Field Office has and obtains
similar information to act as if the director is also a
shadow profit maximizer yielding a condition for each period
expressed just as equation (27) for efficient resource
allocation.
Each procurement field office director would inform
the appropriate accounting field office director and the
Budget Field Office director of his intended purchases so
that they could include them in their planning and check
to see if any constraints are violated.
The Material Accounting Field Office director knows










t i Kt (66)
The Manpower Accounting Field office director knows




- (B)Lt_1 + J.Nt_ 1 (67)
QL1 + TLt i Lt (68)
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Essentially each accounting field office director acts
as if his objective is to account for the factor resources
from knowledge of their respective decay parameters (a, 3)
and their respective inputs from the procurement field
offices for each period LN, , N ). By charging an appro-
priate shadow price each director intends also to meet the
requests of the Military Effectiveness and Technology Field
Office directors just within his availability constraint
so that no resources go unused.
The Budget Field Office director knows or is informed
of the following information for each period.
(QKt + TKt )qt + ( QLt + TLt )wt < Qbt (69)
C ( -N. , _N. ^ < b (70)pKt'Lt— pt
w. = w w._-| (71)
q t
= ^q t_ x (72)
b, = to) b, , (73)
o t o o t-1
b. = ( a) b. , (74)
p t p P t-1
The director acts as if his job was to ensure the budget
constraints are fully exhausted but never exceeded, and to
provide the appropriate information to the requesting field
offices. He would accomplish this by altering his composite
prices accordingly.
Ideally if each office acts in the manner specified in
the preceding paragraphs, the possibility exists in this
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process of obtaining a set of decentralized conditions
identical with the conditions described by (18) through (44).
Such a possibility rests on the basis that convergence of
the process does in fact occur. Proof of convergence would
require a more exacting specification of the procedure than
described in this paper.
Two conceptual issues are raised by the iterative nature
of the process described in this section. They are, at
what values are the initial shadow values set, and how close
o
is close to an optimal solution. The initial specifications
of the shadow prices by all offices are not necessarily going
to be optimal. If for example the shadow prices of the
factors are too low, the field offices would request more in
the way of inputs than the accounting field offices would
have available. Also, the Budgeting Field Office would
probably indicate that the operating and maintenance budget
would be exceeded. Alterations in the shadow prices are
conceived of as occurring until the Central Planning Office
had decided a point close enough to the optimal had been
reached, at which point physical transactions amongst the
offices would occur.
No costs have been attached to these iterative processes
in this paper. If a model included costs of the iterations,
and in fact each iteration brought the system closer to an
optimum, the stopping rule would be to stop when the increase
8Ibid, pp. 74-78, 82-86.
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in effectiveness was not justified by the cost of one more
9iteration.
Of importance in this section is the understanding of
how to model the decentralization of the centralized model
offered in this paper of the DOD resource allocation prob-
lem. The particular offices while having no intended
counterparts in reality give a structure to the process of
allocation which highlights the role of technology in such
a decentralized system.




An aggregate model of the defense resource allocation
problem which incorporates technology was formulated in
this paper. Technology was considered as a neutral, disem-
bodied form of knowledge. Decision rules for efficient
resource allocation were obtained and interpreted and
parametric variations were conducted. Decentralization
possibilities of the model were discussed.
The author feels that the aggregate relationship
depicted in Figure 5 can be utilized as a framework on
which to build models which conceive of technology in other
forms, such as embodied, factor-augmenting, etc., and com-
binations of the same. It is the conjecture of the author
that different perceptions of technology simultaneously
obtain in the minds of different decision makers involved
in defense resource allocation. A research strategy then
is suggested which would involve modeling technology in
each of its variations within the framework suggested.
Following this a synthesis of these models into a behavioral
process model to explore variations in decision-making due
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Technology is incorporated into an aggregate model of
the defense resource allocation problem. The Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System provides a frame of
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future research concludes the paper.
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